

W1.55141

OUR BRITISH ALLY

DEC 28 1945

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
VIRGINIA



EM 41

G I ROUNDTABLE



Prepared for
THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
by
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

This pamphlet is one of a series made available by the War Department under the series title *GI Roundtable*. As the general title indicates, *GI Roundtable* pamphlets provide material which information-education officers may use in conducting group discussions or forums as part of an off-duty education program, and which operators of Armed Forces Radio Service outlets may use in preparing GI Radio Roundtable discussion broadcasts.

The content of this pamphlet has been prepared by the Historical Service Board of the American Historical Association. Each pamphlet in the series has only one purpose: to provide factual information and balanced arguments as a basis for discussion of all sides of the question. It is not to be inferred that the War Department endorses any one of the particular views presented.

Specific suggestions for the discussion or forum leader who plans to use this pamphlet will be found on page 40.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 2 August 1944

[AG 300.7 (2 Aug 44).]

EM 41, *GI Roundtable: Our British Ally*.

Current War Department instructions authorize the requisition of additional copies of this pamphlet for use by military personnel on the basis of two to a company or similar organization. Additional copies should be requisitioned from USAFI, Madison 3, Wisconsin, or nearest Oversea Branch.

Distributed for use in the educational and informational programs of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This distribution is not to be construed as an endorsement by the Navy Department of the statements contained therein.

EDUCATIONAL SERVICES SECTION, STANDARDS AND CURRICULUM DIVISION,
TRAINING, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Copies for Navy personnel are to be requisitioned from Educational Services Section.)

EDUCATION SECTION, WELFARE DIVISION, SPECIAL SERVICES BRANCH,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Distributed to Marine Corps personnel by Special Services Branch. Additional copies or information may be obtained from unit Special Services Officers.)

TRAINING DIVISION, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL, COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

(Copies for Coast Guard personnel should be requisitioned from the Commandant (PT), U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington 25, D. C.)



*OUR BRITISH
ALLY*

FOR CENTURIES BRITAIN HAS SAILED THE SEVEN SEAS



Her march is o'er the mountain waves,
Her home is on the deep.

YE MARINERS OF ENGLAND
THOMAS CAMPBELL (1777-1844)







OUR BRITISH ALLY

SINCE the middle of 1940 we have rapidly grown conscious of the place of the British in the world and in our world. In the early months of the war we took it for granted either that the conflict was no concern of ours or that of course the French and British would win it. But when the German blitz swarmed over western Europe, crushed the French, and seemed only to pause for breath before striking down England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland—yes, and the rest of Ireland as well, in spite of Dublin's neutrality—it suddenly dawned on us that the British people, their industries, and their navy were our front line of defense against Axis ambitions. The collapse of that line, we began to realize, would be the prelude to a mighty attack on the Americas from east and west alike. In that onslaught Germany and Japan would control the resources of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, and be masters of all the oceans. We should, as the President put it, be "living at the point of a gun," or rather of two guns, an island with enemies on both sides.



“Hard-headed concern for our own security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wish to live” therefore dictated the need for giving Britain every possible support short of war. This policy was not based on any unselfish or sentimental regard for the harassed British or on our admiration of their dogged ability to take it on the ground and to dish it out in the air. An American poet could let her heroine declare that “in a world where England is dead I do not wish to live.” But American political prose said that “in a world where England is dead, it is going to be very much harder for us to keep alive.”

By winning the Battle of Britain in the air, the British saved themselves, and gave us time to make the necessary investments in our own security. We traded old destroyers for the use of British bases in the western Atlantic. We gathered up guns, ammunition, and planes to help reequip the British army which had left most of its stores behind at Dunkirk. We invented Lend-Lease to cut the cash out of “cash and carry” purchases of munitions. We took over more and more of the work of patrolling the western Atlantic to make the “carry” part of Lend-Lease less dangerous, and on the eve of Pearl Harbor we decided that our own merchantmen could arm themselves and take cargoes all the way to Britain. Thus step by step a growing realization that our interests were tied up with those of Britain led us to stand behind her. Then Pearl Harbor and

the declaration of war on us by the Axis powers forced us to stand alongside the British.

Meanwhile the British also rapidly realized their need for us. In the early days of the war, if an American said to a Briton, "We are not going to be in this one," the reply would probably be, "I hope not." When Germany bared her full might, that hope had to be abandoned. But for a time the Briton thought he might be able to pull through if we would relax the restrictions on his purchase of supplies. "Give us the tools and we will finish the job," said Mr. Churchill in the spring of 1941. Yet tools would probably not have been enough. As events developed there was no chance to see if they were, but we may doubt whether the 47,000,000 people of Great Britain, supplemented by the men from the dominions, would have been able to defeat an enemy which had the manpower and industrial plant of central and western Europe at its disposal.

For more than two years now we have been allies on the basis of



common dangers, mutual aid, and similar interests. We are mixed up together in a manner unknown in World War I. The British have accepted our generals as supreme commanders in the Southwest Pacific and Europe, regardless of the relative numerical strength of British, Australian, and American contingents in these battle zones. Our Lend-Lease materials go to help supply their needs, while their goods and services are handed over to meet our requirements in lands where our men are stationed. The political, administrative, and military leaders of the two nations are frequently in conference—an interesting contrast to World War I, when President Wilson met none of the Allied prime ministers until more than a month after the Armistice. This mingling is likely to continue long after the last shot has been fired and the last bomb has been dropped. Americans will probably be working with Britons and people of other nations, making plans, and generally helping to get the world back onto its feet.

In such circumstances it is natural that we should ask: What sort of fellow is this partner of ours? Can we understand him? In what ways is he like us, in what ways different? What did he do in peacetime? What sort of government has he? Can it be democratic with its king, lords, dukes, knights, and other titled folk? Is he conservative, class-ridden, hidebound, Tory? If he is, why do some of our people come back from London and tell us Britain is headed straight for socialism? And what really is this Empire, Com-



monwealth of Nations, or whatever he calls it? Why should he be proud of governing other peoples, sometimes even against their will, or at any rate be so determined to hang on to his empire? Finally, why didn't he do something to stop Mussolini and Hitler before they grew too powerful?

Asking Questions about Each Other

The Briton must not mind our asking such questions, since he himself is asking a lot of similar ones about us. If we have much to learn about him, and many misconceptions to correct, he is in the same fix about us. He has not in the past given us much sustained thought or study. In his schools he might get a fair amount of American geography, but we dropped out of his history books at the time of the American Revolution. From that event onward we appear in them only when some really important Anglo-American problems crop up, and on a panorama that covered 2,000 years of history, such problems didn't crop up often. The War of 1812, for instance, would not receive more than a paragraph in a British high school history text.

If the Briton went to college he would learn a good deal more about us, in patches rather than in whole cloth, but his teachers would prefer that he studied a few things intensively rather than spread a smattering of superficial knowledge over the universe. There was so much to be learned about his native land, about Europe, and the Empire that his time was almost fully occupied on those topics. In fact he did not show much eagerness to learn about his own Empire, and when Australians or Canadians went to England they were often startled at the average Briton's ignorance about the dominions.

Today, from the youngsters upward, Britons are trying to learn more, to get at something nearer the truth, and if possible the whole truth. Recent accounts tell of an exhibition called "America Marches," put on in London by our Office of War Information and its British counterpart, of a series of conferences attended by thousands of high school students in provincial towns to learn about

American conditions, of countless lectures, of the demand for more American news in the shrunken newspapers, of questions put to our men who are over there, and of the best-seller position gained by books on American conditions.



"I SAY, YANK, WE KICK
A FOOTBALL . . . WHY DO
YOU CHAPS CARRY IT?"

Yet the questions asked often indicate how difficult is the road to understanding. Our men sometimes puzzle the British by asking about things the British simply take for granted. The same is equally true the other way round. Suppose, for example, that you were host to an intelligent observant young Briton. He would be puzzled by many features of our politics, sports, education, and meals, and might ask such things as the following: Why does a small state like Nevada have the same number of senators as a populous one like New York? Why do you begin to get excited about your national elections more than a year before the votes are cast? Why do you have czars of baseball and movies? Why do you allow substitutes in football; why do you need such elaborately drilled signal plays; and what is the purpose of organized rooting? Why are boys in the upper grades and in high school not taught chiefly by men?

These questions would all spring from the fact that he had noticed something to which he was not accustomed, and was curious to know the reason—and they would probably puzzle most of us. The best that we could reply would doubtless be that there was



some perfectly good reason—historical, political, economic, social, or otherwise—the nature of which we could not at the moment recall. And we should make a mental note to put him on a similar spot if we were ever his guest in England.

Understanding another people is no easy task. It is often difficult for those of us who live in one region of the United States to understand the attitudes, ways of life, or even the speech of those who belong to other regions. Understanding the British is a much harder task. It requires a knowledge of a stretch of history at least three or four times as long as our own story since the settlement of Jamestown or the coming of the Pilgrim Fathers. We need to remember that many peoples have found their way to the British Isles and helped to produce its mixed stock—Celts, Angles, Saxons, Scandinavians, Normans, Jews, and Protestant refugees. Who is a typical

Briton? The royal family is of German ancestry, the leading newspaper proprietor is Canadian, the most famous cartoonist is a New Zealander, the first woman in Parliament is a Virginian, and Mr. Churchill is half American. We can perhaps picture a typical Scot, Welshman, or Irishman; but who is typical of England—Charles Laughton, C. Aubrey Smith, Gracie Fields, or the late Leslie Howard?



Apart from these human considerations, we need to know the influence exerted by a mild climate, never very hot or very cold, but often rainy, raw, or foggy, too fickle for the planning of picnics, but good to work in. We have to take account of the variety of natural resources, some of them rich and abundant. Finally we must keep in mind the effect of being surrounded by sea and of being located on the edge of an ocean. The ring of sea has given security from invasion for nearly a thousand years, and let the British get on with their work, play, and politics with a sense of safety which made unnecessary the keeping of a large army and bred a feeling of isolation and of insularity. There is a stock joke about a weather report which once appeared in the *London Times*: "Dense fog over English Channel. Continent isolated." The position on the edge of the Atlantic fostered seafaring enterprise and offered an open gate to all the seven seas.

There is no space here for an examination of all these influences. But we can make some progress toward understanding the British by examining the following four aspects of their life: (1) the land and its inhabitants; (2) the country's economic activities; (3) its social structure; and (4) its political institutions, methods, and outlook.

A Crowded Country

Our concern is not with the whole of the British Isles, but only with that part of the two chief islands which comprises the political unit known as "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." This unit contains all three parts of the larger island—England, Wales, and Scotland—which make up Great Britain. It also includes the six counties of Northern Ireland which insisted on remaining part of the United Kingdom when the other twenty-six counties of Ireland became a self-governing dominion, called the Irish Free State, in 1922. Northern Ireland obtained what was equivalent to a state government, with its own legislature, administration, etc., but still continued to send a few members to the British Parliament in London. The rest of Ireland, containing four-fifths of the area and seven-tenths of the population, gained the same dominion status as was enjoyed by Canada, with complete control over its own internal and external affairs. It used this control in 1937 to declare itself a republic and changed its name to Eire. In 1939 it exercised its sovereign right to declare itself neutral, and has remained so. Hence the British and then we ourselves have had to by-pass Eire and use only Northern Ireland as a base.


The total area of the United Kingdom is less than 95,000 square miles. England contains just over 50,000 of them, and is about the size of Alabama or a little larger than New York. Scotland is about as big as Maine, Wales has the area of New Jersey, and Northern Ireland is a bit larger than Connecticut. Lumped together, the four parts are equal to the area of Oregon, or to that of New York and Pennsylvania combined.

Small though the country is to begin with, its area of useful land is still smaller. A quarter of the whole kingdom is classified by statisticians as "rough grazing land," and the emphasis should be placed on the word "rough." Half of Scotland, a third of Wales, and a ninth of England is covered with mountains, moorlands, or gloomy valleys, swept with rain and wind or shrouded in mist; picturesque perhaps, but of little use to man or beast.

Yet this small patch of Europe, one-thirtieth the size of the

United States, carries a population of 47,000,000, which is more than a third the size of our own. It is equal to that of our five most populous states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, and California—and of our six least populous states—Nevada, Wyoming, Arizona, Delaware, Vermont, and New Hampshire—all eleven put together.

In this contrast between small area and large population we have the first outstanding feature of British life. Britain is a crowded country. It has an average density of 500 people to the square mile, but in England, where nearly 40,000,000 out of the 47,000,000 live, the figure rises to 770. The density for the United States is only 45, and that of our five most populous states is about 140. Only three states—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey—exceed the average for all Britain; and even the most crowded of them, Rhode Island, falls a little short of the average for England. Thus, the Briton, in at least four cases out of five, does not live in quaint thatched cottages or stately mansions; he is a townsman or a suburbanite. In 1931 two out of every three lived in towns of more than 20,000 people, and four out of ten in centers with at least 100,000 inhabitants. A quarter of the whole Scots population was in Glasgow and its suburbs, and nearly a quarter of the people of England and Wales resided in the vast expanse that is Greater London.



What Do the People Do for a Living?

The second characteristic of the British people goes hand in hand with the first. They are overwhelmingly a nation of manufacturers, miners, traders, and transport workers, or are engaged in those countless professional and personal services which flourish in urban

communities. Very few of them are farmers. In the prewar years only six out of every hundred gainfully employed persons worked on the land.

The rest of them were distributed as shown in the first column of the following table. In the second column we have the distribution of workers in the United States.

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS ENGAGED IN DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS

	Great Britain	United States
Agriculture	6	18
Mining	5	2
Manufacturing and construction	33	29
Trade and transportation	23	26
Professions, personal service, and all others	33	25

In each country the overwhelming majority of the people are engaged in industry, trade, transportation, or service occupations. In each the relative numerical strength of the farming class has declined steadily during the last fifty years. But our farm families still comprise about a fifth of the whole nation; in Britain they constitute not more than one-fifteenth.


It is obvious that these few farmers, working intensively the small area of good land available, simply cannot supply all the food and raw materials needed by the rest of the 47,000,000 people. In peacetime they did manage to produce about two-fifths of the country's food supply; but even their most heroic efforts have been unable to provide more than about two-thirds of the shrunken food supply available during the present war. They cannot provide enough hides for leather or enough wool for cloth; and it is impossible for them to grow such tropical or subtropical products as oranges, silk, cotton, rubber, coffee, tea, or bananas in a climate where 80° in the shade is regarded as a deadly heat wave. The rest of the food and raw materials must be imported, and they

BRITAIN'S FOOD PROBLEM

BRITAIN, WITH A TERRITORY OF



HAS TO FEED



498 PEOPLE PER SQUARE MILE

THE U.S.A., WITH A TERRITORY OF



HAVE TO FEED




44 PEOPLE PER SQUARE MILE

GRAPHIC BY PICK-S

HOME-GROWN FOOD INCREASES IN BRITAIN

BEFORE THE WAR:



N O W :



GRAPHIC BY PICK-S

must be paid for by the export of coal and manufactured goods or by the rendering of shipping, banking, insurance, and commercial services to people overseas. So we come to the third basic characteristic of British life—the great dependence of the country on its ability to sell and serve abroad in order to be able to buy and import. In technical jargon, Great Britain lives largely in an “export-import economy.”

It was not always so. There was a time when the country fed its less than ten million people and when most industries catered chiefly to the domestic market. But conditions began to change about two hundred years ago, as Englishmen and Scotsmen devised new industrial methods or invented new equipment. Their machines, water wheels, steam engines, and applied science gave them the power to produce iron, steel, cloth, crockery, hardware, etc., in far greater quantities, more quickly, more cheaply, and often of far better quality. Having transformed production, they turned to revolutionize transportation. They put a steam engine on wheels and created the railroad. They put another engine into the hull of a vessel and produced the steamship. In short, they discovered a new frontier for their energy and enterprise; on it they built a huge workshop, or factory, which for a long time was almost the only one of its kind in the world; and into it they gathered a population that was doubling itself every fifty years.

To supply that workshop and its workers the outside world was combed for food and raw materials. Tariffs were abolished, and the ports were thrown open to welcome, free of duty, supplies from any continent. The grain or pork of the North American prairies, the lamb, beef, wheat, and wool of Australia and Argentina, the butter, eggs, and cheese of Denmark, Siberia, and New Zealand, cotton from our own South, lumber from the Baltic or Canada, iron ore from Spain or Sweden, and a score of other products of farm, forest, ranch, plantation, or mine flowed into Britain in an ever broadening stream. In the pre-World War year of 1913, for instance, the country imported the wheat or flour it needed for forty-two weeks out of the fifty-two. For every man, woman, and child there arrived 170 pounds of sugar, 65 pounds of meat, 23 of

FOR YEARS BRITAIN HAS BEEN ONE
OF THE WORLD'S BEST CUSTOMERS



. . . back from a global shopping trip

potatoes, 20 of butter or cheese, 7 of tea, but only 10 ounces of coffee. When the British housewife went marketing she was a global shopper. She drew on domestic, imperial, or foreign supplies, and bought what seemed the best value for her money, regardless of where it came from. In her basket she probably carried home some food from every continent.

For every dollar's worth of food imported another dollar's worth of raw materials was brought in, and about fifty cents' worth of finished manufactured articles from those other workshops which gradually grew up in Germany, France, Belgium, Japan, and the United States. If these newer industrial countries could make articles which were better or cheaper than those made in Britain, the British readily bought them, and no tariff stood in the way to raise the purchase price.

Thus Britain became a tremendous customer of the farmers and miners of the outside world and a good customer of the other industrial lands. Of every six dollars' worth of goods that people in all countries sold beyond their own borders in 1913, Britain bought one. In return she exported about one-third of her coal output; 4,000,000 miles of cotton piece goods, which went especially to the Far East; 100,000 miles of woollens; vast quantities of iron and steel, engines, machines, chemicals, and steamships built for foreign buyers; and a great variety of articles, such as books and beer, clothes and crockery, shoes and Scotch (or Irish). All told, these exports absorbed one-third of the country's total output from farm, mine, or factory. It would probably not be far wrong to say that in 1913 one worker out of every three was engaged in producing goods for export or carrying them to the overseas consumer.

With these exports Britain paid for most of her imports, but not all of them. For nearly a hundred years she has always bought more goods than she sold. The difference has been paid for by selling services of various kinds. In 1913 Britain owned two-fifths of the world's ocean tonnage, and earned money by carrying passengers and cargo for every nation. London was the banking, commercial, and insurance center of the world, and earned large sums for the trading and financial services it rendered to clients scattered over the globe. Finally Britain was the world's leading foreign investor. Its capital flowed abroad to be invested in colonial or foreign government loans, or into the stocks and bonds of industries, mines, railroads, banks, oil fields, rubber plantations, tea gardens, ranches, shipping lines, etc. In all, about \$20,000,000,000—at least a fifth of the country's wealth—was invested overseas in 1913.

The income from these services and investments—these "invisible exports" as they are called—paid for the excess of visible imports of food, raw materials, etc., over the visible exports of coal and manufactured articles. In fact, that income often more than paid for the excess. When all the bills had been settled there was still some money due from the outside. This money the British usually left overseas to be lent or invested in further developing the New World or in modernizing more of Asia and Africa.



MINING 1,120,300



AGRICULTURE 1,352,900



PROFESSIONS 840,500



INDUSTRY 5,375,900



TRANSPORT 1,830,200



COMMERCE 2,318,800



SERVICE 2,628,500



BUILDERS & C. 1,089,900



CLERICAL 1,522,100

OTHER TRADES 2,692,170



OCCUPATIONS OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE

PREWAR CENSUS



By developing and expanding this world-wide exchange of goods and services for goods, the British prospered, and never more so than on the eve of the first World War. They were able to maintain a growing population on a rising standard of living, a standard which was the highest in Europe. But war upset the exchange. Exports had to be reduced. Foreign customers had to do without British supplies, get them from us or the Japanese, or begin to make the goods for themselves. After the war some nations raised their tariffs, and others were too poor to buy. Consequently the British found it difficult to win back their old customers or to find new ones to replace the old. Japan, India, and China now made their own cheap cottons, and the Oriental market was lost to Lancashire. The demand for woollens was injured by changes in clothing fashions; the need for coal was reduced by the growing use of oil or electricity; the shipyards were idle, for the world had too many ships. By 1929 none of the old staple export industries had regained



HOW BRITAIN PAID FOR WHAT IT BOUGHT ABROAD

BASED UPON A CHART PUBLISHED BY *FORTUNE*.




-  = goods.
-  = shipping, insurance, banking,
and similar earnings.
-  = income from overseas invest-
ments.
-  = gold.

The scale on the left side is in millions of pounds sterling. For all years except 1932 the pound was a little less than \$5.

NOTE: (1) In 1913 and 1929 there was a surplus left over for further investment. In 1932 there was a deficit.

(2) In 1913 the "invisible exports" paid for about two-fifths of the imports, in 1932 for one-third, and in 1938 for one-third. But in 1938 gold was also exported in large quantities to balance the account.



its prewar position, and when the depression, which began in 1929 widened and deepened in every part of the world, Britain's visible and invisible exports alike dropped again by half.

This collapse brought Britain to the acute crisis of 1931. While the exports were down by half, the imports had fallen only a quarter. Hence the country did not have enough exports to pay for its imports; it was about \$500,000,000 short. It had 3,000,000 unemployed, and its stock of gold was being drained out of the country. Obviously the export-import formula no longer worked. If the country could not sell, ship, and serve abroad in its old volume, it could not buy abroad in the grand old easy manner. Or, to put it another way, if people overseas would not buy from Britain they could no longer expect to sell duty free to her. She must produce more goods at home, import only what she could afford to pay for, and buy from countries which were willing to take her goods in exchange.

The free trade policy which had been the basis of British "free enterprise" for eighty years, and which had left manufacturers, miners, farmers, and shipowners to seek their own salvation in a competitive world without any state protection, was discarded. Tariffs were imposed on most imports. Commodities from the dominions and colonies were admitted duty free or at preferentially lower duties, and at an imperial conference held in Ottawa in 1932 the various parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations agreed to treat each other's goods more favorably than they did those from other lands. The British farmer was helped by tariffs, by limiting the amount of imported foods, and by subsidies. Trade treaties were negotiated with countries which were willing to make reciprocal tariff concessions.

The years between the two wars have thus seen Britain's foreign trade become a less important part of the country's economic life. The fraction of the total output that was exported fell from 33 per cent in 1913 to 22 per cent in 1930, and possibly to 15 per cent on the eve of the present war. Coal mining, cotton weaving, and ship-building became generally regarded as "declining industries," which would never again be as large or flourishing as they had been. But

by way of consolation for this loss, there was a great expansion in many new industries between the two wars. In Britain as in the United States, there was the coming of the automobile and of all the industries and occupations which the car and truck brought into being. There was a widening use of electricity and electrical appliances; a vast spread of cycling; a great increase in the commercial production of bread, cakes, candies, and canned goods; a widespread spending of more time and money attending movie houses, playing or watching games, going on hikes or holidays, or seeking other forms of relaxation; and there was a vigorous effort to overcome the shortage of houses and to wipe out slums.



The first World War impoverished the old rich and many of the middle class; but it raised the wages of many workers, and various other factors helped to improve the condition of the general population outside the depressed industries. Hence there was more money to spend on the activities and commodities listed above. Between 1923 and 1938 the number of persons working in these "expanding" occupations rose 50 per cent, while the number in the "declining" industries dropped nearly 25 per cent. Some of the new industries might export goods, but most of them served only the domestic market. They helped Britain to recover more quickly than did any other country from the depression of 1929-32, and the nation discovered that it could do a lot more work for itself at home instead of relying so heavily on overseas buyers.

Yet the old order is still vitally important. Britain can creep part way into the shelter of its domestic economy; but the country is too small to be a foxhole for 47,000,000 people. The British cannot live

alone, unconcerned with the rest of the world, or even the rest of the world outside the Empire. They cannot feed themselves, they cannot produce all the raw materials they need, and they have no domestic supply of gasoline. Britain must continue to import on a large scale, and the problem of paying for those imports is one of her fundamental postwar problems, perhaps *the* fundamental problem. Many of her foreign markets are gone for the duration, and will be hard to regain. Her invisible exports will be greatly shrunk; for in the first place her merchant marine has been greatly reduced and she will face the competition of a vast new fleet of American freighters; and in the second place her income from overseas investments has declined, may disappear entirely if the war lasts long, and may be replaced by a debt to foreign creditors. It is estimated that 70 per cent of her overseas investments have been sold to pay for war supplies; she owes India more than she had invested there, and perhaps the same is true in the case of Canada, the Argentine, and possibly Australia. Consequently the invisible exports which used to pay for over a third of the visible imports will be very much smaller; in place of the old inward excess flow of goods to pay interest, etc., there may have to be an outward excess flow of British goods to pay interest on top of the flow which goes out to pay for food and raw materials.

If postwar conditions are such as to make international trade possible on a large scale, the British will go after it eagerly in order to pay what they owe and to buy what they need. Under the stress of war they have scrapped much that was old in their industrial equipment, organization, and methods, and have shown ingenuity and efficiency of the very highest order. The nation which designed the Spitfire and the Rolls Royce engine, which had radar all ready for use in 1940, which built the *Queen Mary*, which discovered the value of penicillin, and which is producing more ship tonnage per man-hour than any other country is far from finished in the world's markets, provided there are any markets.

If there are few markets, the outlook will be gloomy, and the British will have to do without many things they would like to import. If this hurts them, it will also hurt the countries whose old

customer or new debtor Britain is, for if she cannot afford to buy from them there will probably be no other good customer available. In the prewar world there was virtually no other place to which Danes, Argentineans, New Zealanders, Australians, Canadians, and many others could sell their farm produce. What they got for it depended in large measure on what the British could afford to pay them. Britain's poverty as exporter in the twenties and thirties accounted for some of the low prices of farm produce in those days. So it may be after this war. If Britain is too poor to buy or pay good prices, sellers the world over will share her poverty, and the task of adjusting themselves to new conditions will be long and painful.

The Social Landscape

If a nation lives chiefly by manufacturing, mining, and trading, its social conditions, its class structure, its politics, and its general outlook on life will be different from those of a country mainly devoted to farming. Yet there will be features which have come down from the days when it was rural and agricultural, when feudal landlords ruled their villages of serfs, when the church was



a great property owner as well as a shepherd of souls, when monarchs wielded as much power as they could obtain or keep, and when the population was neatly divided into recognized classes. Revolutions may destroy much of the old order, but they rarely wipe it out entirely; and the British have never had anything comparable to the French or Russian revolutions. Their changes have come gradually; it has been said that they always leave the initial

"r" off their revolutions. Hence the large landlords, the church, and the monarchy are still there; but the pressure of events and the inevitability of gradual change have made them very different from their ancestors of 1215 (the year of Magna Carta), of 1776, or even of 1900.

The landlord is one important legacy of the past. Often, but not always, he owns many acres; it was recently stated that twenty-six dukes own in all over a million acres, or about one-fiftieth of the whole country. Through the centuries, land has been an attractive form of property, for the income it yielded, the political power it carried, or the social prestige it gave its owner. Consequently successful merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and others have always been eager to "buy a place in the country," and the landlord class has thus been constantly sustained with new blood and fresh capital. Sometimes the owner is the crown, the church, the universities, or some other endowed institution.

The landlord does not usually work his estate. He divides it into farms, provides the capital needed for permanent improvements and buildings, and then leases the farms to tenants. They supply their own working capital and equipment, and if the farm is too large to be worked by their families—as is often the case—they hire the necessary number of laborers. This trinity of landlord-tenant-laborer has had its merits and its defects. If times are good the landlord can raise the rent, and the laborer may hope for an increased wage. If times are bad, the landlord will have to reduce the rent, thus cushioning the blow struck by falling prices or bad crops at the farmer's head, and the laborer will have to take a cut in his wages.

During the last war the farmers did well, and the government set up machinery which gave the laborers higher wages. But the landlords were hit hard by new land taxes, and by much heavier income taxes. Some tenants were therefore willing and able to buy their farms. Many landlords were willing to sell, and a great transfer took place. In 1913 only one farmer in nine owned his land; but by 1927 one in three was a cultivating owner. Between the two wars, however, agriculture became much less profitable in England,

as in the United States. Farmers had difficulty in meeting their mortgages and obtaining working capital, and the landlords had no cash to spare for improvements. In spite of tariffs, subsidies, and other state-aid schemes, agriculture was far from healthy in 1939. Some leading agricultural economists were convinced that the land should be "nationalized." If the state owned the land, they argued, it could provide the capital needed for drainage, reclamation of wastes, reorganization of fields, merging of small farms into larger operating units, modern buildings, better roads, etc., and thus make it possible for the tenant farmer to get the greatest possible yield from the soil, and use his own funds for working expenses instead of spending them to buy the land.



Many of these suggested changes have been made under the stress of war. The results have proved the value of the proposals; but the land has not been nationalized. Whether it will be, only time can tell. But it is evident that the landlord class, burdened heavily with taxes, cannot now discharge its old function of supplying the capital needed for keeping the agricultural plant in first-class order. A class which cannot do its job effectively may not last long.

This pattern of rural life is strange to us, as we do not have its characteristic features, or at least do not have them so highly developed. Three-fifths of our farms are owned by their cultivators, against one-third in Britain. Our landlords are mostly ex-farmers, banks, and insurance companies, and often they hold the land unwillingly because some debtor has failed to meet his mortgage. Finally, hired labor plays a smaller part in our farming life.

When we turn to British urban, industrial, and commercial life we are more familiar with the social landscape. It is much more like what we know. The British picture began to be painted at

least half a century before we started ours; the styles are different, and the paint on ours is not yet all dry. But the general features, the composition, and the colors are very much alike.

The British were the first people to encounter and wrestle with the problems of modern industrial society. In that society industry, trade, transportation, and most other forms of enterprise came to be organized in the hands of individuals, partnerships, or corporations, who got together the necessary sums of capital and credit, bought equipment and materials, and then employed as many wage or salary earners as they needed. Sometimes an enterprise needed little or no hired help, as for instance in the small retail store, the repair shop, or the legal, medical, and other professions. But often hired workers were needed by the score, hundred, or thousand. Consequently society sorted itself out into classes. The largest by far consisted of persons who owned little or no capital, land, or property of their own, and who therefore depended for their income on their ability to sell their labor for wages or salaries. The second class consisted of those who ran their own little business or professional service. The third were the larger employers—personal,



corporate, or governmental—who ran the business themselves or used paid managers and officials. Finally there was a small class of people who owned so much capital or real estate that they were able to live on the interest, profit, or rent they collected.


The relative size of these groups is well known. Of 49,000,000 gainfully employed in 1930 in the United States, 6,000,000 were farmers, about 3,000,000 were employers or employed themselves, while 40,000,000—or 80 per cent—depended chiefly or wholly on wages or salaries for their sustenance. The British distribution is

about the same. Of 21,000,000 engaged in all kinds of work on the eve of the war, over 16,000,000 were wage or salary earners. Thus each country had about four-fifths of its working population in the employed class.

For the members of this largest group in modern society, two questions are important: How can I improve my welfare inside my class? How can I improve it by getting out of my class? The second may be asked more frequently in the New World than in the Old, since climbing the economic ladder, going from rags to riches, or passing from hired man to hirer of men has been much easier in North America or Australia than in Europe or Asia. It is not as easy now as it was in the days when free or cheap land was abundant, when the frontier was moving westward, and when an industry, a store, or a bank could be started on a shoestring. But there is still opportunity for a few to climb the whole ladder, for some to go up a few rungs, and for wage earners' children to obtain the education which may help them to rise to well-paid executive or technical positions or to independent professional practice. Yet the overwhelming majority of wage and salary earners must remain dependent on a pay check or pay envelope.

The situation in Britain has not been very different from our own, save for the fact that there were no such opportunities as were offered by our vast public domain. In the industrial frontier days of the nineteenth century poverty need not be a bar to advancement for the man who combined ability, love of hard work, and a passion for thrift. The British textile, metalware, clothing, and mercantile occupations were well sprinkled with self-made men, and the new industries of the twentieth century have provided some similar opportunities. British radio sets carry the names of pioneer makers who started in small sheds. The British counterpart of Henry Ford began his working career as a repairer of flat tires in a bicycle shop. The spread of public high schools and universities since 1900 has ended the days when higher education was dispensed almost solely by expensive private schools and two ancient universities to the sons of the middle and wealthy classes. The provision of scholarships has made it possible for the talented son of poor

parents to attend high school and university without paying a penny in fees or having to "work his way through." Consequently the professions, the public services, and the technical or administrative jobs in industry, commerce, and finance contain an increasing number of men whose fathers were artisans, small shopkeepers, or "lower middle class" white-collar workers. Britain is far more a land of equal opportunity than it was forty years ago. Yet there is little



prospect that more than a few wage and salary earners will ever be other than what they are.

To them, therefore, the vital question has always been: How can I improve my welfare inside my class and my job? Two answers were possible. In the first place wage earners might band together and through their labor organizations strive to protect and improve their working conditions and standard of living. In the second place, those who were unable to organize—children, young persons, women, and unskilled workers—could be protected and helped by the state.

The results of more than a century of voluntary labor organiza-

tion and of state interest in living and working conditions are evident on every hand in Britain today. Labor organized in five main ways. The first was the trade union, which sought to protect and help the individual as wage earner. The second was the consumers' cooperative society which helped him as wage spender. The third was the friendly society—or sick club—which looked after him when he was ill or old and thus unable to earn wages. The fourth developed facilities for workers' education. The fifth was the political movement, which sought to mobilize wage earners in support of a labor party with its own distinctive program. Of the five, the first, second, and fifth call for further comment.

Trade unionism first found its feet about 1850, grew steadily among skilled workers, and after 1890 spread to unskilled employments, white-collar workers, and, in a less degree, to women workers. The total membership in 1939 was over 6,000,000, which is equivalent to 18,000,000 in the United States. The strength of the movement is well described by G. D. H. Cole as follows: "Wages and conditions in all the big industries are habitually settled by collective bargaining; and even the few big employers who refuse to recognize trade unionism commonly observe trade union rates. The right of the workers to organize and to bargain collectively is not a matter of dispute. Trade unionism is as much part of British industrialism as the joint stock company; and consultation of the unions by the government in all matters of labor policy is a well-established practice, whatever the complexion of the Ministry in power." Yet there is no legal compulsion on workers to join unions or on employers to recognize them. Even during the present war there has been no attempt to limit the operation of collective bargaining. Strikes and lockouts can still take place if negotiations break down. The government has provided arbitration machinery to which the disputants may submit their case if direct discussions fail; but there is no formula which limits the verdict the arbitrator can give or the wage increases he can grant.

Consumers' cooperation celebrates its hundredth birthday in 1944. Its founders, a handful of Lancashire flannel weavers, started with a one-room store in a mean street, selling flour, butter, sugar, oat-

meal, and candles to themselves, thus eliminating the retailer's profit. Similar groups in other towns and villages dug a few shillings out of their pockets to finance stores. Soon the movement spread from retailing to wholesale dealing, to manufacturing the goods the stores needed, to banking, a bit of farming and shipowning, and a lot of insurance. At every point the consumers provided the capital and received a fixed rate of interest on it; they managed the business democratically and received back in dividends on their purchases whatever surplus was left when operating costs and interest charges had been met. By 1939 over a thousand societies were at work, with nearly 8,500,000 members. Over half the British people bought much or all their food, clothing, furniture, fuel, comforts, and luxuries from the "co-op," and employed more than a quarter of a million persons to produce or distribute these goods under a system which retained interest but had done away with profit.

The political labor movement is much younger, scarcely fifty years old. Any description of it must be prefaced by a brief account of the British political system.

What about the British System of Government?

If we were explaining our government to a Briton we might start off by handing him a copy of our Constitution. If he was doing the same for us, he could not start in that way, for the British have no such basic document. Their political system has been in the making for over a thousand years. During that time the methods of law-making, administration, justice, and tax collecting have taken shape and the relations between the government and the governed have been developed. Occasionally some dispute concerning those relations or some friction between different parts of the political machinery started a fierce political struggle. This might lead to civil war, to the execution or eviction of a monarch or minister; or it might end in nothing more serious than the writing down of rules to prevent the point at issue from causing a dispute in future. Hence there are bits of a written constitution, such as the Bill of Rights, habeas corpus, and a law defining the relations between

the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Yet these laws could be repealed by Parliament if it wished to do so. For the rest, the constitution is unwritten; there is no comprehensive document, and no supreme court to prevent other parts of the government from doing things on the ground that they are unconstitutional. But there are countless traditions and precedents and well-accepted understandings which bind—sometimes like a rubber band, sometimes like a ring of steel.

The political system of today is the result of five important historical developments. The first was the gradual emergence of Parliament as a tax-levying and lawmaking body, and the establishment of its supremacy over the king and his ministers. The second was the development of the cabinet, as a committee of members of Parliament headed by the prime minister, entrusted with the task of running the affairs of the country, but subject always to the approval of its actions by Parliament. The third was the gradual widening of the franchise to allow the whole adult population, first male and more recently female, to vote for candidates for the House of Commons. The fourth was the recognition by the unelected House of Lords of its subordination in legislative matters to the House of Commons. The fifth was the growth of strongly organized parties, with distinctive and permanent policies and with central and local machinery for getting out the votes and for keeping the party alive between elections.

As a result of these developments, the House of Commons, normally elected at intervals of not more than five years, virtually rules the country. Since 1911 the Lords may not alter or reject any measure passed by the Commons for raising or spending money. They can reject twice, in two successive sessions, any other bill; but if the Commons passes it a third time, the measure then goes to the king, who automatically assents to it as he does to all other bills, for he has no veto power.

The House of Commons controls the administration. There are more than twenty departments, and each has a minister as its political head. Most of the ministers are members of the cabinet. The prime minister picks them and presides over cabinet meetings. But



1066-1100 ENGLAND UNITED.

England has been invaded in historic times by Romans, Jutes, Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans. The last invasion occurred in 1066 under William the Conqueror. He succeeded in bringing all England under his rule.



1154-1189 COMMON LAW ESTABLISHED.

In feudal society local barons administered the law—pretty much as they pleased. Henry II appointed trained judges to apply the “king’s justice” equally to all. The jury system was developed at this time, too.




1215 MAGNA CARTA.

King John had overridden the rights of the church, nobility, gentry, and townsfolk. All united to force his assent to Magna Carta. This great charter of liberty required the king to rule according to law.



1600-1700 STRUGGLE BETWEEN KING AND PARLIAMENT—BILL OF RIGHTS.

The Stuart kings thought that they were above law and could levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. The struggle that ensued—part civil war and part revolution—cost Charles I his head and James II his throne. After the right of *habeas corpus* was established in 1679 citizens could not be imprisoned without trial. In 1688 the Bill of Rights set forth the constitutional supremacy of Parliament over king.



1824 REPEAL OF ANTI-UNION LAWS.

In 1824 the so-called “Combination Laws” of 1799 and 1800 were repealed. These had made it illegal for workmen to unite for the purpose of improving their wages, hours, and working conditions.



A THOUSAND YEARS

1918 VOTES FOR WOMEN.

Women over 30 were given the vote in 1918. In 1928 the voting age for women was lowered to 21. Now every adult citizen in Britain has the vote and can help govern the country.



1295 FIRST PARLIAMENT.

Edward I said, "What touches all must be approved by all." So he called together representatives of all classes with political rights to confer with him about making laws and levying taxes.



1300-1400 PARLIAMENT CONTROLS TAXATION AND LAWMAKING.

Early Parliaments met only to hear the king's wishes and to present grievances of the people. During this century the power of Parliament grew by practice and precedent.



1500-1600 CHURCH OF ENGLAND ESTABLISHED.

In the 15th and 16th centuries parts of Europe revolted from the papacy. England became Protestant with its own national and official Church of England. The pope was denied both influence in and revenue from England.



1829 POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR CATHOLICS AND NONCONFORMISTS.

Before 1829 only members of the Church of England were allowed to vote, hold office, and the like. Since then these rights of citizenship have not been limited because of religious belief.



1832 THE FIRST REFORM BILL.

The Reform Bill of 1832 fixed new election districts by population. "Rotten boroughs" (ghost towns) lost their members of Parliament to new factory cities which had none. Later bills gave the vote to all men.



1911 PAYMENT OF MEMBERS OF COMMONS.

Power to veto bills passed three times by the popularly elected House of Commons was denied to the hereditary Lords. Salaries provided for members of Commons allowed poor men to run for Parliament.

OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

he and they are responsible to Parliament, especially to the Commons. All of them must be members of Parliament, most of them are in the Commons, and it is now the rule that the prime minister must be a member of that House. The Commons controls the ministers in three chief ways; by asking them questions for an hour each day when Parliament is in session, and by making trouble if the answers seem unsatisfactory; by refusing to grant all the money the cabinet asks for or to accept the tax proposals submitted to it by the chancellor of the exchequer if it does not like what the ministers have done or plan to do; and by drastically amending or even rejecting measures submitted for passage by the Commons. By any one of these three methods Parliament can voice its approval or disapproval of the ministry. Disapproval would force the cabinet either to resign in favor of another group of parliamentarians, or to ask the king to dissolve Parliament in order that a general election could decide between the ministry and its critics.

Parliamentary control of the executive is thus the accepted theory of British government. But who controls Parliament? Here the party system exerts its influence. The real line of division is not between parts or branches of government, but between parties, policies, programs, and personalities. The people choose the party they prefer; it has even been said that they choose the prime minister they prefer. The party which wins most seats dominates the Commons, and from its members the prime minister and most of the cabinet are chosen. The ministers and their departmental officials frame bills to carry out the party policy, and their supporters naturally vote for these measures, just as the minority party naturally opposes them. Some, perhaps most, of the supporters are yes men, who vote faithfully as required. Others may be more independent and critical; but they would not vote with the Opposition if such action meant the defeat of their own party, resignation of the cabinet, or the wear and tear, cost, and uncertainty of a premature general election. Hence the party in power must support its cabinet, critically perhaps, but loyally. There must be give-and-take between the majority and the cabinet, but in general the cabinet's leadership and initiative must be accepted. In effect this results in cabinet

control of the Commons, especially in time of crisis or emergency.

The cabinet is thus the core of the system. The prime minister is the center of the core. His responsibilities, burdens, and power have become enormous in the recent decades of war and postwar dislocation. He has to be his party's mouthpiece at election time. He names and manages the cabinet. He has to be well informed on the main problems of the day and have a general idea about the minor ones. He has to keep the king informed of what is going on. Yet in addition he has to play the star role in the House of Commons—leading debates, meeting attacks, and planning strategy.

To discharge these many duties as driving force and directing head, he must be a good debater, and be well-grounded in parliamentary procedure and methods. Wealth, good social connections, and education at a famous school and ancient university were once indispensable, but today humble birth is no bar and high birth no sure passport to the office. Of the nine prime ministers since 1900, five belonged to the industrial or business upper-middle class, and two were born in poor men's cottages. Only four had been to Oxford or Cambridge. Three entered the Commons in their mid-twenties, thus starting young on a political career. Nearly all held minor posts and then cabinet positions before becoming prime minister. Thus they served a long and varied apprenticeship in the House, in office and in Opposition, in the departments, and in the cabinet room at 10 Downing Street. For example, Mr. Churchill entered the House in 1900, when he was twenty-six years old. At one time or another he was in charge of colonial affairs, of home affairs, of foreign trade, the navy, munitions, the air force, and the exchequer. In the intervals he was an ordinary member and a far from tame one. At last, at the age of sixty-six, he became prime minister in the nation's darkest hour.


Prime minister, cabinet, and Commons are the three most important parts of the British constitution; but three other parts call for brief description. The first is the king. George VI is the forty-fifth person to sit on the throne in the last thousand years. During the last three or four centuries the royal power has been so whittled that only one important constitutional function remains. When a

Changing the Guard



Pageantry and ceremony

at Buckingham Palace



link the past with the present

prime minister dies or resigns, the king picks his successor. Yet even that choice is usually automatic because, if the old government has been defeated, the leader of the Opposition is the inevitable successor and, if there is a general election, the leader of the party that wins it is obviously the people's choice, and the king must choose him. His other constitutional acts are all done on the advice of his ministers. He has "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn," and if he has accumulated knowledge, experience, and understanding by spending many years on the job he may be a valuable counselor and elder statesman. The ministers need not take his advice, since they are responsible to Parliament, not to him; but at least they may have to admit that his views are not likely to be based on short-run party-political expediency.

As the king has lost his old power he has found other tasks to fulfill. The occasional displays of pageantry and ceremony link the past with the present, much as does our own ritual on Thanksgiving Day, Inauguration Day, or the Fourth of July. They satisfy that love of a parade, of gorgeous colors and ordered movement, that plays a part in religious worship, in graduation exercises, or in the conventions of some fraternal orders. Their central figure embodies the unity of the nation in a person, rather than in a flag. The king can be patron of philanthropic, intellectual, or social-service organizations, tour the Empire, lay foundation stones, go to the big races or football matches, visit bombed areas or battle fronts, and at every point serve as a tie to bind a nation together as no elected person could ever do.

That tie binds more than Great Britain. When the leading British colonies reached the status of self-governing dominions, the only constitutional link that bound them and Great Britain together was the fact that they were "united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The same man was king of the United Kingdom, king of Canada, king of Australia, and so on. Further, he was the same sort of constitutional monarch in every capital, acting on the advice of his local ministers who in turn were re-

sponsible to their local legislatures. As a distinguished Canadian said recently, "We went to war as a free people of our own free will, fighting for freedom. King George the Sixth of England did not ask us to declare war for him. We asked King George the Sixth of Canada to declare war for us." No British prime minister could serve as such a bond between the dominions. Australians and Canadians have often disliked intensely the policies and leader of the party in power in London. If there has to be a head acceptable to all and above party politics, there is none so serviceable as a monarch.



Most Britons would stoutly defend the monarchy so long as the king does his job well. Attempts to advocate republicanism have always failed because there did not seem to be anything to be gained by the change. But they would be hard pressed to make out a strong case for that other ancient institution, the House of Lords. This House is as old as the Commons, and the two have grown up side by side. They began as tax-granting bodies; the big landlords and high clergymen met in one group to consider how much they could afford to give the king out of their own pockets; the representatives of the smaller landlords and of the townsmen met in another group to decide how much they were willing to promise the king out of the pockets of the folk back home. This separate deliberation continued when Parliament developed into a lawmaking body.

About 750 peers are entitled to sit in the House of Lords; but the attendance rarely reaches a hundred. Some of the peers are bishops or archbishops, but over 700 of them hold hereditary titles. Few of these are very old; only 50 go back more than 250 years.

The rest are less than a century old, and nearly half of them have been conferred since 1906. Some men were given their titles—lord, duke, or whatever it might be—for services rendered the state as admirals, generals, administrators, or statesmen; but often the service had been rendered to the party or to the party campaign chest. After the last war this sale of titles became a glaring scandal, and since that time awards have more frequently been made as a recognition of outstanding success in business, industry, public service, intellectual achievement, generous philanthropy, and the arts. Consequently the peerage is no longer chiefly a collection of descendants of landed aristocrats; it is far more a body of men who have done well for themselves, for the state, or for mankind. Behind a lordly title there probably lurks a businessman, a banker, or a brewer; but there may be an eminent surgeon, musician, economist, or even a labor leader.

The tone of the House of Lords is likely to be aristocratic and plutocratic, and its politics Conservative. Early in the present century it rejected Liberal proposals for increasing the taxes on the rich in order to finance social reforms. This combination of party politics and self-defense led to the clipping of the Lords' wings so far as vetoing legislation was concerned. Yet it would be wrong to think of the House of Lords as nothing more than a home of deep-dyed reactionaries. It has frequently displayed real statesmanship, independence and liberality of thought. Its members have no voters back home to please, can therefore say what they think, and some of them do think hard and well. At times they have been guardians of personal liberty when the Commons had been panicked into rash or vindictive measures. Consequently, while no one is satisfied with the House of Lords as it is today, the British cannot agree on what to do about it. Many would hesitate to entrust their welfare solely to cabinet and Commons. But no one knows what a perfect second chamber should be like, and the House of Lords therefore continues to meet, to carry on its business in a leisurely manner "not unlike that of a well-conducted funeral," and as W. S. Gilbert once said, to do nothing in particular but to do it very well.

Finally, there is the civil service, that body of public employees of many ranks and classes which carries out the work of government. In the last forty years the British government, like our own, has greatly increased the number of things it does, either as a result of popular demand or under the pressure of events. Consequently the civil service has grown in size, importance, and power. Less than a hundred years ago the service was run on the spoils system, and was notorious for incompetence, ignorance, and red tape. Then the mess began to be cleaned up. A civil service commission set out to hunt for the best young brains available, to pick men by stiff competitive examinations out of the graduating classes at the universities, to set up fixed salary scales with regular raises, to offer security of tenure subject to good behavior, and generally to make the service attractive to well-qualified men. The result was that gradually the state secured a band of honest and able officials. No matter what party came into power they stayed on at their posts. Those in the higher ranks wielded great influence as aids to their political chieftains, especially since a new minister had to be taught his business by his permanent heads. It is sometimes said of them that they are unadventurous and unimaginative, because of their dislike of parliamentary criticism and their desire to play safe. But few have questioned their combination of extraordinary high intelligence, competence, and character; and these qualities are more precious than lighthearted enthusiasm for new stunts.

Parties and Policies

The two chief British parties today are Conservative and Labor. A quarter of a century ago they were Conservative and Liberal, with Labor as a new challenger but not yet strong enough to seem a serious threat to the old parties. The party names tell a little about the policies. The Conservatives wanted to conserve their economic, political, and social vested interests, rights, and privileges, to look after the landlords, the church, and the Empire, and generally to resist as long as possible any change which might hurt them. But as the manufacturing and commercial classes grew

strong, and as the middle class, wage earners, and villagers gained the vote, some of the "new rich" were welcomed into the Conservative fold, while the party had to advocate popular measures if it wished to get enough votes to win or keep power. Hence important social or economic reforms were carried through by Conservative governments because they believed in them, because events made them necessary, or as a device for "dishing the Liberals."

The Liberals included some landowners, but represented rather the new industrial and commercial classes. They wanted liberty; they believed that men should be liberated from old restraints on their free development—free trade, freedom for the colonies, home rule for Ireland, and so on; but when freedom seemed to produce bad results they were willing to impose restraints to protect the sufferers. They were opposed to the old privileges of the church, the landlords, and to the power of the House of Lords. They were for peace, retrenchment, reform, and low taxes. But early in the present century they embarked on a program of social security, old-age pensions, etc., to be paid for partly by higher taxes on land and incomes. They did this partly because they believed in it, and partly to "dish Labor."

These two old parties ran Britain politically, economically, and socially. The richer families formed a privileged section of society, which filled the good private schools and old universities, the diplomatic services, the judiciary, the naval and military high posts, the colonial administration, the Lords and Commons, and "high society." Much of this class domination had always been there; there was nothing new about it, except that some people were beginning to doubt whether the "right people" should enjoy the thick end of such an unequal distribution of wealth, power, and opportunity.


After 1900 the Labor Party arrived on the scene. It was the child of two parents, as is usual. In the first place some wage earners decided that their interests would never be adequately cared for by the old parties. In the second place new ideas about social betterment were floating around and conditions which had existed for decades or centuries were now being regarded as shameful. Here in the heart of a great empire there were widespread poverty, low

wages, overlong hours, slums, ill health, malnutrition, inadequate education, acute misery. All this in spite of countless beneficial laws and widespread voluntary organization. The cure, said some men, was not in passing more reform laws, though these might help to ease the situation. The real cure was socialism, a new economic order in which the means of production, distribution, and exchange would be owned by the state and worked for the benefit of all rather than the profit of a few. These reforms and this ultimate revolution were to be brought about by building up a labor party, which might eventually be strong enough to form a cabinet and pass the necessary laws to "nationalize" whatever branches of enterprise seemed best suited for the change.

So the Labor Party was born. Its main strength and much of its funds were provided by the trade unions, as were most of its candidates. It won a few seats before 1914, but at the end of the war it made a bold appeal to all "workers by hand or by brain," and attracted much wider support from salaried and professional people. In its growth it weakened the Liberals, for some joined Labor but others went Conservative. Twice it held office, in 1924 and in 1929-31; but it did not have an absolute majority in the House of Commons, and had to rely on the support of the small Liberal Party. In 1931, when a terrible financial blizzard hit Britain, the party split on the policies necessary to cope with the crisis. Some of the leaders joined hands with the Conservatives and Liberals to form a "National" government. Most of the Labor members remained loyal to their party and functioned as the Opposition.


This government appealed to the people in a general election, and was returned with an overwhelming majority. The Conservatives soon dominated the coalition, and through the thirties they were in virtual control of the country, with Labor as the Opposition. When however Mr. Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, he invited the Labor Party to join hands with him, to allow some of its leaders to enter a coalition cabinet, and generally to help in running the war. Labor said "Yes" unanimously, and since 1940 has shouldered its share of the task, with one man as deputy prime minister, others in the war cabinet and in charge of

SOCIAL SECURITY



This chart records the growth of state plans for social security in the last forty years. What was at first a limited plan to care for the destitute out of taxes gradually spread to cover most people from the risk of lack of income because of sickness, unemployment,

IN GREAT BRITAIN



or old age. It became a vast insurance scheme to which workers paid weekly contributions while they were well and busy, and to which employers and the state also made contributions. The Beveridge Report of 1942 recommends still further extensions of such insurance.

very important departments. Parliamentary criticism of the cabinet is not silenced, but it is no longer party criticism. In spite of provocation, the Labor Party has faithfully kept the truce it entered into in the days before Dunkirk.

This united front has been possible not merely because a grave emergency called for it, but also because British party divisions do not cut as deep as they seem to do. Labor has had no chance to see if it could turn any part of its public ownership program into reality. Yet the Conservative Party, which has been in power for most of the last two decades, and which is professedly antisocialist when it talks of social theories, has taken Britain at least four steps along the road toward public enterprise. It organized radio as a state service in the British Broadcasting Corporation, financed by a small annual license fee paid by the owner of each radio set, rather than by selling time to advertisers. It reorganized the making of electricity by establishing a board which built a series of super-



power stations and distributed cheap electricity to every part of the country. It took over the jumble of busses, streetcars, and subways that served Greater London, and put them in the hands of a public transport board. It nationalized coal deposits as a prelude to reorganizing the mining industry.

Some of these steps look like socialism; in fact the London transport plan was prepared by a socialist minister when Labor was in

power, and was put through by his Conservative successor. But they were not taken because they fitted into any abstract theory of enterprise, private or public. Such questions as "Is it constitutional?" or "Is it socialistic?" are less important to the British than the query "Is it necessary, is it desirable, and will it work?" In a country which has long had publicly owned streetcars, gaslight, electricity, telegraph, and telephone, and which in 1936 established a long-distance phone call service from any part of the country to any other for twenty-five cents after 7:00 p.m., there is no philosophical or "natural" objection to state action if the results promise to be satisfactory and if existing interests are fairly compensated for any injury that may be done them.

As in the past, so it is likely to be in the future. In the postwar years no matter which party is in power, the plans for reconstruction will probably contain much government aid to private enterprise and much government enterprise as well. But if the state nationalizes the land, the banks, or the railroads, it will not do so because it has become converted by the socialist arguments of the Labor Party intellectuals, but because the step seems to be a necessary method of promoting the country's welfare.

In domestic politics, therefore, parties differ in their views as to the expediency of a proposal and of the methods to be used, rather than in their fundamental aims. In imperial affairs the same is largely true. The British people in general give little thought to their Empire. Visitors to England from the dominions are so dismayed by this lack of knowledge and interest that they ask themselves (a) How did the British ever put an empire together? and (b) How do they keep it together? Those who do think about the matter will readily admit that there are dark chapters in the imperial story, but they will insist that at least they are no darker than the chapters telling how other people have handled black, brown, or redskinned races. They may remind us that if the British had not taken a particular area some other nation would have done so, and that historically it was not a matter of free and independent India versus British India, but of British India rather than French, Dutch, Portuguese, or even Russian India. They will point with

pride to the developments which turned colonies into dominions, which have already transferred the greater part of Indian rule to the peoples of that peninsula, and will transfer the remainder when those peoples can agree on methods of using it. They will remind us that any picture of crude exploitation of natives has been out of date for at least half a century. And if they know much of our history, they may ask if our own hands are spotlessly clean.

Imperial policy has largely been in the hands of the two older parties. The Liberals were much more favorable to colonial self-government than were the Conservatives; the latter were keener on plans for tightening imperial ties than in what seemed like loosening them, and they bitterly opposed the granting of home rule to Ireland. Yet it was a Conservative prime minister who handed over to Eire three Irish naval bases, thereby seriously weakening the ability of the British fleet to fight the Battle of the Atlantic when war came. As for Labor, it approves self-government wherever possible, and the recognition that Britain must serve solely as a trustee for the welfare of natives in regions not yet ready to rule themselves. In short, no party is imperialist in any conceivable old-fashioned sense of that word; but no party would passively watch any part of the Empire pass into the hands of any other people than those who inhabit it, or would turn them adrift to sink or swim.

In foreign affairs the differences between party views have also been relatively small, until the Labor Party began to try out some of its ideas in the 1920's. A change in government from Liberal to Conservative brought little alteration in foreign policy. There were three basic needs that must guide any party in protecting the nation's vital interests: (1) Britain must guard its home base, the



British Isles, against any attack, especially from across the Straits of Dover or the southern part of the North Sea. If a strong power held the other side of the Straits, Belgium, or the mouth of the Scheldt, it could hold a pistol at the head of England; and if any such power dominated the Continent, especially the western half, it might menace the British Isles. British policy therefore had to be watchful of France in the centuries when France was powerful. It had to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, and take notice of Germany when that nation grew strong and built a large navy. (2) Britain must protect its overseas Empire. (3) It had to defend the lanes of sea communication with the Empire and with foreign markets.

These three lines of policy could easily and cheaply be pursued from the days when France ceased to be a menace till the time when Germany became one. A modest navy was all that was required; the army could be small, and conscription was unnecessary. If any power threatened to become dangerously strong, Britain might throw its weight behind states that were endangered, and thus restore the balance of power. But this would be the limit of its willingness to play a part in Continental affairs. If we were isolationists, the British were limitationists. They would not tie their hands in any entangling alliances, but act only if their three interests were threatened.

All three were threatened when Germany rose as a power seeking to dominate the land mass of Europe and to challenge Britain's sea lanes as well. The British were slow to realize the new danger before the first World War, but once awake they did an amazing job. A country which began with an army of 250,000 regulars and 250,000 spare-time volunteers eventually put 6,000,000 men in uniform, while carrying most of the naval burden, making mountains of munitions, and financing a large part of her Allies' efforts.

At the end of the first World War a million of the Empire's soldiers were dead, the export-import economy was badly damaged, and a national debt of \$40,000,000,000 rested on Britain's shoulders. The country's three vital interests seemed to have been made secure again, and perhaps any future difficulties might be dealt with

by the League of Nations. Many Britons, especially Liberals and Laborites, were enthusiastic supporters of the League. They believed as much as we did that aggressors would in future be restrained by signing pacts to "outlaw" war, by respect for treaty pledges, by membership in the League, and by fear of the public opinion of the rest of the world, especially if that opinion was voiced through the League and supported by some joint economic boycott of the offender.

Britain and the Aggressors

During the 1930's the world learned that aggressors care little for world opinion or for slaps on the wrist. When the League and we ourselves scolded Japan for invading Manchuria, Japan simply walked out of the League and went on walking into China. This lesson was well learned by Germany and Italy and gave them the green light. Year after year they gathered speed. Italy invaded Ethiopia. Germany rearmed in defiance of her pledges and treaty obligations. Germany and Italy helped the rebels in the Spanish War. Germany annexed Czechoslovakia and Austria, Italy grabbed Albania, and Germany took Memel and finally set out to swallow Poland. And all the time Britain and France let them "get away" with plan after plan, while we publicly cried "Why doesn't somebody do something?" and wrapped ourselves round in neutrality acts. When at last the British and French and then the United States decided that the aggressors must be halted, we were taking on the job of stopping cars which were well tuned up, had plenty of gas, and were moving at a fast pace. The wonder is not that we were hit hard, but rather that we were not killed.

It is still too early to know fully why the British acted (or inacted) as they did. At every step in the aggressors' advance, Liberals, Laborites, and even Conservatives demanded that their government take action to stop them, usually through the League. But they spoke as if they believed that words would be enough—and strong words are wasted breath unless you are willing to back them up with deeds. The deeds may be only an economic and

general boycott, but a boycott is a use of force to compel another nation to change its course of action, and it may be met with counterforce, leading to shooting, and so a war begins. Further, a boycott is not likely to be effective unless everybody is in it against the aggressor, and at no time was there enough unity among the large nations, or between the League and the United States, to make a complete boycott possible. Our own laws, for example, did not permit an embargo on oil shipments to Italy in Ethiopia.

Hence the British might well plead that League action against Japan and Italy would have to be enforced largely by the British navy, and that in doing that job it might have to start fighting, or at least might have to stop ships which were taking goods to the aggressor. And the British navy was not as strong as it had been, especially in comparison to other navies. It is generally agreed that a nation's foreign policy must be related to its military policy—and vice versa. That is, there must be a reasonably close balance between the foreign political commitments a nation is obligated to fulfill and the military force available to it for carrying them out. Thus, if a nation proposes to police the world's oceans, it must have a large navy; if it sets out to protect the boundaries of every small country, a tremendous army and air force are called for. Conversely, if a nation lacks the requisite strength, it had better not undertake too much responsibility outside its own borders.

The British in the 1930's did not have enough strength to take on the aggressors, even if they had been fully disposed to do so. The army was back to its old small size, the navy had been weakened, and the air force was good but probably far weaker than the one the Germans had secretly been building. Britain was slowly recovering from the combined effects of World War I and of the great depression, and was taxed up to the hilt. Its people had no desire to go fighting again, and many of those who insisted that something be done to the peace-disturbers were vigorous opponents of expenditure on armaments. There was a widespread pacifism in the land, and young men were solemnly announcing in their debating societies that under no circumstances would they fight for king and country.

This attitude was not merely part of the general disillusionment after the previous war; it was part of a troubled conscience. The British had persuaded themselves, or had let themselves be persuaded, that they treated Germany very shabbily in the Treaty of Versailles. Their love of sportsmanship made them feel that there were parts of that treaty which looked too much like kicking a man when he was down, hitting him below the belt, or were just "not cricket." Hence they were not disposed to fight to prevent Germany from amending those parts of the treaty which they knew to be indefensible *if* there was any other way of doing the job; and the Nazis knew the British well enough to exploit that attitude to the limit. The British also knew that you cannot permanently keep down a nation of nearly 70,000,000 energetic industrious people, and that you ought not to try. Better meet their legitimate grievances and welcome them back into the family of European nations as a partner, as a balance against the expanded might of France, and as a possible barrier against Communist Russia. Then if Britain, France, Germany, and Italy could reach agreement, iron out their differences and remove causes for complaint, the peace of Europe might be maintained by their joint strength and their common purpose.

British Conservative policy in the thirties was therefore dominated by these two considerations: first, that the country was not strong enough to serve as policeman extraordinary for the world, or to go running round like a knight-errant rescuing damsels in distress everywhere; and second, that she was willing to let Germany correct the more glaring "mistakes" of Versailles on the assumption that when these grievances had been removed Germany would be "satisfied" to become a "good European." Unfortunately the British misread their Germany; or rather they read Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* only in an English translation, from which all the frightening parts had been omitted. Hence it was possible for them to agree that there was nothing they could do to prevent Hitler from taking Austria, and that since Austrians were of German stock perhaps the union, although a shotgun wedding, was desirable. It was possible to accept the transfer of the Sudeten Germans from Czecho-

slovakia to the *Reich*, since they were Germans; the Sudetens and the Czechs would never get on well together, so it was best to let them be separated. And when Hitler said he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe, perhaps he meant what he said.

When, in March 1939, Hitler grabbed the rest of Czechoslovakia and showed that he did not mean what he had said, the scales fell quickly from British eyes, as did the mask from Hitler's face. There was little time to make up for the years of appeasement and of misplaced confidence; but there was no lack of courage in facing the inevitable. Poland, the next victim on Hitler's list, was given a pledge of support, a treaty of alliance was signed with Turkey, while Greece and Romania were promised help if attacked.

A great heap of heavy commitments was thus shouldered, and a frantic attempt had to be made to gain the strength necessary for carrying them. Conscription was introduced, rearmament was speeded up, closer relations were established with France, and an attempt was made at long last to reach a defensive pact with Russia. But Hitler beat the British at Moscow by promising to leave the Russians alone and to let them take territory on their western border. Meanwhile we turned a cold shoulder on Britain and France by reaffirming our intention to sell no munitions to them. There were many in France who were convinced that the great days of France were over, and that it had therefore better climb on the German band wagon and go along with its big neighbor next door. If ever the odds were stacked in favor of a country, they were in Germany's favor in September 1939. If ever a nation seemed in a hopeless position, Britain seemed so in that same month. The fact that she did not flinch is the measure of her quality.





To the Leader

HOW TO USE THIS PAMPHLET

This *G. I. Roundtable* pamphlet is intended to help you as a leader of off-duty forums or discussions. It contains in compressed and readable form much information about British political, economic, and social institutions. Discussions of the fundamental similarities and the obvious differences between our two peoples can be a great force in bringing about mutual understanding between us.

The material in this manual is so arranged that you can develop more than one meeting from it. There are suggested below certain main lines of inquiry together with subsidiary questions which you may wish to have considered under each. While it is possible that you may have time in your program for only one discussion on the subject, you would do well if it is practicable to plan a series of meetings on it. In carrying out the latter plan you may desire to select one of the major lines of inquiry for each meeting in the

series. If you have time for only one meeting, you should limit the single session to the one major area which seems to offer the most fruitful results for your particular study group.

(1) *What are some specific things about Britain and the British that Americans may not understand?*—Breakdown questions: Are there differences between us and the British that are difficult for us to explain? How many of these are superficial differences in manners and customs? How many are differences based on an unfamiliar social or political point of view? How may the observed differences be explained? By climate? By geographical location? By education? By differing traditions? By the length and character of British history? By crowded conditions of living? Are there similar points of misunderstanding between Americans from different parts of the United States? How do we reconcile such differences so as to maintain national unity? In trying to understand the British is there something we can learn from sectional differences in the United States? Have you noticed that there are things about America and Americans that the British fail to understand? Do you think that such things should be serious obstacles to friendly understanding between our two peoples? Are there strong similarities between the customs and ideals of the British and our own? Would you say that the differences or the similarities are more important? Why?

(2) *Are the conditions of living and the economic activities of the British similar to ours?*—Breakdown questions: Can Britain be called a “crowded country”? Do the British earn their livings in the same way as Americans? Is Britain agriculturally self-sufficient? Why have manufacturing and trade been important British pursuits? Do the British have a protective tariff system similar to ours? Is it true that the British believe in “free trade”? Does British prosperity depend more on foreign trade than ours does? Are British industry and science as efficient and ingenious as our own?

(3) *What are British social institutions like?*—Breakdown questions: Does the British landlord system fit modern conditions in British agriculture? Is it in process of change? Is there anything

in our system of operating farms that is similar to this pattern of rural life? Is British urban, industrial, and commercial life similar to ours? Is it more difficult for an individual Briton to improve himself than it is for an American? Does British organized labor hold a stronger position than American labor does? Why? How important are cooperatives in British life? To what extent is the titled aristocracy a legacy of the past? Is there any comparable group in the United States?

(4) *What about the British system of government?*—Breakdown questions: How can the British get along without a constitution? If the House of Commons virtually rules the country, is it reasonable for the British to have their king and House of Lords? Is the British cabinet system different from our method of administering our government? Is this system more or less democratic than ours? Which system reacts more quickly to a change in public opinion? Do you think civil service employees have greater influence on government policies in the United States or in Britain? Is the British Commonwealth something different from the British Empire? Are the British conservative, socialistic, or practical in their attitude toward social reforms? Why did the British government let the Nazis get away with so much before declaring war? In their attitude toward the Nazis before 1939 were they different from us?

The four areas above have been broken down in the main by questions that are informational rather than controversial in type. The following questions may be used to develop discussion of the latter type:

Should we continue close collaboration with the British after the war?—Suggested breakdown questions: Is the character of the British people such that Americans can easily reach an understanding with them? Does British dependence upon foreign trade mean that economically they must compete rather than collaborate with us? In particular, is British trade with Latin America a possible source of friction? Should we deal directly with the dominions or with the Commonwealth as a whole on economic problems? Is our attitude toward the place of smaller nations after the war essentially the same as that of the British? Should Britons and Ameri-

cans cooperate in the postwar development of international air transportation? Is the British attitude toward provisions for social security similar to ours? Have they more acute problems of unemployment and dependency to face in the postwar period than we have?

Types of discussion: If you have a small group, a well-conducted series of informal discussions is the best plan. If your group numbers forty or fifty or more members, use panel discussion or forum type meetings. For a sizable audience a discussion by a panel has many of the advantages of informal discussion. If you choose to set up a series of forum meetings, be sure to have a speaker or speakers who are experts on Britain and who can hold an audience well.

Assuming that you present the question "Do you know the British?" before a series of informal meetings, you will find it helpful to appoint at least one assistant leader for each meeting. He should be prepared, either in a five-minute talk or in the course of the discussion, to supply data that are necessary for intelligent consideration by the group. Locate for this job a man who knows Britain and the British.

Start the discussion off yourself by some question like:

Is the United States socially more democratic than Britain?

Is it harder to make a living in Britain than in the United States?

Has the prime minister more or less power in his country than the president has in ours? Is the British responsible cabinet system more democratic than our system of separating executive from legislative authority?

Techniques for organizing and conducting all of the suggested types of discussion are outlined in EM 1, *G. I. Roundtable: Guide for Discussion Leaders*, a numbered Education Manual published in the same form as this pamphlet. This guide should be in the hands of every leader of discussion in the Army.

Charts. Make full use of the illustrations in this manual. They will help you get the facts across. Reproduce the diagrams in a size large enough for easy reading from the back of the meeting

room. The reproductions will be effective even if they are crudely done. Fasten them to a handy wall, blackboard, or other stand.

Reading by group members. Make a copy or two of this manual available for reading in the library or other reading center. The information about Britain possessed by members of your group is likely to be spotty and incomplete. Some individuals will have specific prejudices toward things and persons British. Not many will have even a reasonably complete set of facts about these Allies of ours. So reading by the members will start your discussion off on a sounder basis.

Suggestions for Further Reading on Great Britain

These books are suggested for supplementary reading if it so happens that you have access to them. They are not approved nor officially supplied by the War Department. They have been selected because they give additional information and represent different points of view.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE UNDER FIRE. By James F. Green. No. 24 of the *Headline Books*, published by the Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y. (1940).

THE ENIGMA OF THE BRITISH. By Harold Callender. No. 21 of *America in a World at War*, published by the Oxford University Press, 114 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1942).

BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE. By Ernest Barker. Published by the Oxford University Press, 114 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1942).

ENGLAND: A SHORT ACCOUNT OF ITS LIFE AND CULTURE. By Walter S. Hinchman. Published by Little, Brown and Company, 34 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass. (1941).

WHY BRITAIN FIGHTS. By Richard H. Tawney. No. 13 of *Macmillan War Pamphlets*, published by Macmillan and Company, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, N. Y. (1941).

THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By Arthur L. Goodhart. Published by the British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y. (1943).

MAKING OF MODERN BRITAIN. By John B. Brebner and Allan Nevins. Published by W. W. Norton and Company, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1943).

BRITISH LIFE AND THOUGHT: AN ILLUSTRATED SURVEY. Eleven essays (also available as separate booklets in which form they were originally published), published for The British Council by Longmans Green and Company, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1941).

BRITAIN'S BALANCE SHEET. Two articles by John Davenport, in *Fortune*, November and December 1943.

EMPIRE IN THE CHANGING WORLD. By W. K. Hancock. Published by Penguin Books, Inc., 245 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1943).


BRITAIN'S POSTWAR TRADE AND WORLD ECONOMY. An article by Howard P. Whidden, Jr., in *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. 19, December 15, 1943, published by the Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y.

THE BEVERIDGE PLAN. By S. Stewart Maxwell. No. 79 of *Public Affairs Pamphlets*, published by Public Affairs Committee, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y. (1943).

ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY: A SURVEY OF SIX CENTURIES, CHAUCER TO QUEEN VICTORIA. By G. M. Trevelyan. Published by Longmans Green and Company, 55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. (1943).

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C.



The time will come when
thou shalt lift thine eyes
To watch a long-drawn
battle in the skies.

THOMAS GRAY
CAMBRIDGE ENGLAND 1737